I would like. Perception, then, involves this psychic state and the physical object, as a result of which there appears forget Cartesian dualism and start afresh on the basis of naturalism. Away with Transcendental Egos and things-in-themselves! The whole the thing. Yet somehow there is a mysterious connection be- terminology must be forgotten. We are conscious organisms, think- tween the real or physical thing and this product of psychic ing the things around us in accordance with our nature and theirs.
Perhaps he does forget about his avoid a representational theory of knowledge, even though "Cartesian" dualism; but is it not true that he himself is there is obviously a complete cleavage between the object as dualistic-if in another way? Perhaps, once again, we should it.
To say that forget about things-in-themselves; but is it not true that he there is an essence involved to explain meaning is valueless himself, although finding Kantianism unacceptable, ends up when it is remembered that a careful scrutiny of his theory with an unknowable thing-in-itself? True, the whole termi- shows essence to be nothing but a mental projection.
It is an nology may be forgotten. It is questionable, however, whether imputation. He identifies datum and essence, but in the last the import of the traditional terminology is escaped in his analysis "datum" is "idea. This is the only interpretation which can Nor can we turn to Durant Drake's theory of the realm of possibly be given to such affirmations as "the idea which gives essence, since he never shows how it is given. As a matter of the content of knowledge the esse intentionale of the scholas- fact, with both Strong and Drake, the word essence means tics is other than the object of knowledge," 58 and, "It is nothing whatever but something which is imputed to sense pretty clear, then, that there are two elements in perception: data, i.
His desire to attribute creativity, though "we intuit only contents. In many He rejects Drake's making of sense data and meanings space- respects although I doubt if he would view it as complimentary Strong agrees with Husserl. This is particularly true of his doctrine less and timeless essences.
What does he put in their place? In this sense they What does he attribute to the knower's capacities which new both oppose Sellars and Drake's representationism. The real point of difference between him and Husserl is to be found in the answer to the ""''The human mind-brain is creative, and this creativity is causally problem how essence is known-due, of course, to their respective controlled and socially conditioned. Realism, How do we know "their" nature?
Drake and others, Essays in Critical Realism, Note his emphasis upon assigned. G1 Ibid. An analysis of his theory of knowledge, Sense data do not stand alone but are enveloped "in a directed particularly as found in his Philosophy of Physical Realism, complex of meaning in the perceptual evidence. As a form of knowledge, it is that perceiving involves organic response.
It is not, however, knowl- The upshot of Sellars' epistemology up to this point is that edge of universals or essences. Then what is "intuited"? After events. Here we get to something upon which the character of suc- other, he continues in this vein by insisting that in the latter cessive events rests, in other words, to substance They represent the equipment of the organism to deal bilities of human experience and ken. Nevertheless, this much with what would otherwise be an unintelligible world. Husserl is to be emphasized: knowledge is not to be reduced to crass wodd call this sheer Kantianism.
As a result of this cate- sense data. Intellection is involved: "We are aware of rela- gorial intellection, our world resolves itself into a system of tions, comparison, meanings, attitudes, references. Fortunately for us, the organism as so equipped Husserl would ask, does he use "awareness" when, as a is provided with an organic act "with characteristics of a uni- matter of fact, relations and meanings are categorial impu- tary synthetic art.
But granting this kind nounce themselves either as qualities or existences, but are of awareness had objective reference, what would be the what they are because of the judgmental, synthetic activity of difference between it and the awareness of existential data?
Sellars himself says that in perceptual ex-. Is that what he means by "intuition"? What role do sense perience data play? Simply that of a stimulus, and this stimulus with I denote and characterize an external thing made an object of my its proper cerebral effect "is just the starting-point of all sorts perceiving.
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It is equally clear that, for this position, concepts are not of directed and massive operations. Sellars, Philosophy of Physical Realism, The word "art" may be a misprint, but obviously its ""Ibid. Did he not mean, "made an object by my perceiving"? At any rate, Sellars believes that in this way he escapes possibly mean in his system ; then it is described as subjec- the causal theory of sensationalism. That may be, but it is tive, something with which we embellish reality. The knowledge made at a great sacrifice, since, although he might refute relation is allegedly "direct.
To con- "Knowledge is just the insight into the nature of the object trol rational intellection, not to tell us anything of objects. He is experience which somehow mysteriously "takes in the rela- willing to admit "the fact of causal mediation while yet pro- tions of things to one another. Perhaps God-since he draws such a cleav- an immediate knowledge of the necessary connection between age between content and physical reality.
But no, that would events. But note this: "the content given is the of such experience means "only to perceive the spatial, tem- essence of the object. This means that content is relevant to the object, that it has a sort of revela- I employ categories of this type in my interpretation of tory identity with the object, that it contains its structure, things.
Yet Sellars insists that his is a theory of "direct" In fact, his viewpoint is strictly that of absolute idealism until, knowledge: "We mean independent objects and we interpret apparently faced with the problem of explaining the relational these objects in terms of ideas. Is the realm of existence "inferred"? It is affirmed "through the very pressure and sug- terms that things are in dynamic relations "because they are gestion of our experience.
Notice the tion, pure and simple: first we are led to believe that relations ambiguity of his statements: only content is intuited, but are categorial, and that means judgmental, coming from the "internally or in the percipient himself, we have the content subjective whole of experience; then it is affirmed that these of perception. This might 69 Ibid. As admirable as this may be, it nevertheless to say that even though our interpretive judgments possess fails to explain the integral relationship between the cate- objective reference, in no case whatever should this be de- gorial equipment of the organism and the world as a whole.
Moreover, Sellars never answers satisfac- causal propositions are empirical and synthetic, but, as con- torily the problem of why we as human beings have such trasted. In them we are judging perceptually the relation between from their behavior, that other creatures do not possess them. In the first place, tionalistic empiricism and Platonic rationalism. Ta:king the. Second, each ends in a dualism between the perceived of which are founded on the organism and its situation.
Whereas Drake and Strong would bring psychic objective reference to being, his affirmation should be remem- states or essences into the picture to explain how the inade- bered that "the categories arise in us as expressions of quacy of sense data is overcome in perception, Sellars, accord- ourselves as operationally immersed in the sea of being. As a matter of fact, Our categories are well founded and therefore valid, ,since of course, there is not much difference, not only because of "Nature conforms to them because nature is their founda- their common subjectivity but because in both instances there tion.
Third, it follows that the things or with the idealists, a complex of ideas due to subjective pat- objects of ordinary perception can in no manner be conceived. Consequently, fourth, is the brain and that its patterns are developed under control the world of physical objects of science remains forever and "and in relation to the organism as a whole"?
Yet, fifth, the scientific, physical objects are part of this physical world and that he perforce must reject somehow the cause of the things of normal perception. Finally, that sort of dualism which would make mind alien to the sixth , since the object of thought is in reality something that we cannot think about, ex hypothesi the realm of physical 81 Loc.
It is a Ding-an-sich, inaccessible to normal orextraordinary 83lbid. Essays in Critical Realism, , in which the "factors" of knowledge are " 1 the affirmation of an object.
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See also his remarks on categories in Essays in Critical phenomenology to accept. It is not made more attractive to Realism, The problem of essences as it concerns other critical realists will be considered later. Husserl whether sensible qualities are called secondary, or, inherently alien to it and separated from it. Aside from its refusal to attribute subsistential, existen- and "analogously" through mathematical concepts.
Husserl tial, or any other kind of existence to the realm of essences, believed that such theories were possible Husserl would find it impossible on grounds of critical realism only so long as we fail to keep persistently in mind, and to establish to believe that there is any evidence that the objects of per- scientifically, the meaning of thing-givenness which lies in the essen- ception are in any way of the nature of the physical object.
The critical Yet, Husserl argued, it can easily be shown that if this realist, moreover, would urge that knowledge is prepositional, "unknown cause" which has been assumed to exist exists at and with this Husserl would certainly agree.
- Relipocrisy (Religious Hypocrisy).
- Heidegger, Aristotle and the Work of Art: Poeisis in Being!
- Maximilian Beck.
But the greatest all, "it must be in principle perceptible and experienceable-if difference between him and them is the nature of this preposi- not by us at least for other Egos who see better and farther tional property of knowledge, since, in the last analysis, the than we do. Husserl's treatment of such problems will become necessity, must be a perception through appearances, and that clear from the following considerations. This he called the "image theory," and entities of the nature of a thing," and that which is allegedly put realism in the same group as using the sign theory of "an explanation in the sense of a physical means of explana- perception.
This 1s sible to Husserl. He must have known of new realtsm's tion between primary and secondary qualities, which he "The 'Program and First Platform of Six Realists" and The rejected on the basis that knowledge is knowledge of the New Realism Yet, strangely enough, m the Ideen he gave object, i.
There is no reason and attacked the arguments of "Realism" as found in later critical to believe that the sensational content of the physicist's experi- realism 52 97 f.